Conversational Implicature

David Sanson

2026-10-12

Preliminary

Agenda

Reminders

  • If you got a C or lower on the first writing assignment, you can improve it to a B by meeting with me and showing that you (now) understand how Frege and Russell would respond to the case you wrote about.
  • Next week is Austin, “Performative Utterances”
  • Illinois Philosophical Association Conference this weekend!

Review

Agenda

Theory

The Cooperative Principle
Make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
Quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true: (1) do not say what you believe to be false; (2) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Quantity
(1) Make your contribution as informative as is required; (2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Relation
Be relevant.
Manner
Be perspicuous: (1) avoid obscurity of expression; (2) avoid ambiguity; (3) be brief; (4) be orderly.

Failures to Fulfill Maxims (p. 30)

A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following:

  1. He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.

Failures to Fulfill Maxims (p. 30)

  1. He may opt out from the operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative Principle; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, for example, I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.

Failures to Fulfill Maxims (p. 30)

  1. He may be faced by a clash: He may be unable, for example, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).

Failures to Fulfill Maxims (p. 30)

  1. He may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfill it. On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because of a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor problem: How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall Cooperative Principle? This situation is one that characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature.

 
Someone who says \(p\) implicates \(q\) if:
  1. It is appropriate to assume that she is observing the conversational maxims and the Cooperative Principle.
  2. Her saying \(p\) is consistent with the maxims and the principle only if we suppose that she also believes \(q\).
  3. The speaker thinks (and thinks the hearer thinks that the speaker thinks) that the hearer can work out that \(q\) is what is required to make \(p\) relevant.

Calculating an Implicature

  • Notice that the speaker is not fulfilling a maxim.
  • Is she doing so blatantly?
    • If so, is she forced to, due to a clash? Is she opting out? Is she trying to mislead?
    • If not, how is what she said consistent with the Cooperative Principle? That is, what \(q\) is she attempting to communicate by saying \(p\)?

Practice

Agenda

Application

  1. A: “Can you finish this by Friday?”
    B: “I’m already working on three other deadlines.”

  2. A: “Is Maya good at her job?”
    B: “She’s always on time.”

  3. (Your team loses badly)
    Coach: “That was a great performance!”

  4. A: “Are you coming to the party?”
    B: “I have an exam at eight tomorrow morning.”

  5. A: “How was the restaurant?”
    B: “The menu was easy to read.”

  6. A: “What happened to the vase?”
    B: “It is no longer in its former state of wholeness.”

  7. A: “Did the candidate answer your questions?”
    B: “He spoke for twenty minutes.”

  8. A: “Can I borrow your car?”
    B: “It is in the shop.”

  9. A: “Did you enjoy the party?”
    B: “It was literally the worst ever.”

  10. A: “Is Leo trustworthy?”
    B: “He hasn’t been convicted of anything.”

  11. (Someone has just burned dinner.)
    “You are an amazing cook!”

  12. A: “Did you finish the report?”
    B: “I opened the file.”

  13. A: “Will the package arrive today?”
    B: “It’s in the mail.”

  14. A: “What did you think of my presentation?”
    B: “I liked the transitions between your slides.”

  15. A: “Did Nina sing?” B: “She produced a sequence of sounds that corresponded closely to the notes.”

  16. A: “Is the hotel nice?”
    B: “It has a roof, running water, and several functioning doors.”

  17. A: “Did I miss anything important on Monday?”
    B: “No, we never do anything important in class.”

  18. A: “Is the café any good?”
    B: “There’s a very nice park across the street.”

  19. A: “Was the interview successful?”
    B: “They said they’d keep my résumé on file.”

Quality
(1) do not say what you believe to be false; (2) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Quantity
(1) Make your contribution as informative as is required; (2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Relation
Be relevant.
Manner
Be perspicuous: (1) avoid obscurity of expression; (2) avoid ambiguity; (3) be brief; (4) be orderly.

Application

Former ISU superintendent R. Patrick Murphy told The Pantagraph Flanagan came out of his house around 9 a.m. on Dec. 5 when Murphy was supervising a crew working on the property. The ISU-owned presidential residence is at 1000 Gregory St.

When Murphy approached Flanagan, Murphy claims the president’s saliva projected onto Murphy’s face, neck and clothing, according to reports. Murphy also alleges Flanagan’s arms hit Murphy in the torso at one point during the encounter. link

Cancelability
Conversational implicatures can be cancelled.

Implicatures and Lies

Agenda

Misleading Truth and Lies

Frieda suffers from a peanut allergy so dire that even the tiniest amount of peanut oil could be deadly. George knows that, and invites her to dinner, murderously preparing a stir-fry with peanut oil. Frieda, appropriately cautious (though not cautious enough), asks, ‘Are there any peanuts in the meal?’, to which George replies ‘No, there are no peanuts’. Frieda eats the stir-fry, and dies. (Saul 2012, 3)

Culpability and Rights

  • When I lie and you believe me, that is my fault.
  • When I say something true and you infer that I mean something false, that is your fault.

Counterexample

Suppose that my office heater is now perfectly fine, although last year it was not. Someone is planning a radiator-fixing effort, and trying to discern where work is needed. They ask me, ‘Does your office have a working heater?’ and I reply (truthfully) with ‘I had to order electric gloves that plug into my computer to keep warm’. In order to understand me as cooperative, the person from estates must take me to believe that my heater isn’t working. They, therefore, clearly have a right to expect that this is true. And yet I have clearly implicated rather than said something false, and thereby misled rather than lied. (Saul 2012, 5–6)

Logical Connectives

Agenda

Logic

…Because it would be incorrect or inappropriate to say “He got into bed and took off his trousers” of a man who first took off his trousers and then got into bed, it is part of the meaning, or part of one meaning, of “and” to convey temporal succession. (Grice 1989, 8)

Logic

The fact that it would be inappropriate to say “My wife is either in Oxford or in London” when | know perfectly well that she is in Oxford has led to the idea that it is part of the meaning of “or” (or of “either…or”) to convey that the speaker is ignorant of the truth-values of the particular disjuncts. (Grice 1989, 8–9)

Logic

Strawson maintained that, while “if \(p\) then \(q\)” entails “\(p \rightarrow q\),” the reverse entailment does not hold; and he characterized a primary or standard use of “if…then” as follows: “each hypothetical statement made by this use of ‘if’ is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent statement, if made or accepted, would in the circumstances be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and the making of the hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or of disbelief in, the fulfillment of both antecedent and consequent.” (Grice 1989, 8–9; quoting Strawson 1952, III pt. 2)

References

Grice, Paul. 1989. “Prolegomena.” In Studies In the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
Saul, Jennifer. 2012. “Just Go Ahead and Lie.” Analysis 72 (1): 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr133.
Strawson, Peter F. 1952. Introduction to Logical Theory. Metheun & Co.