2026-10-12
Agenda
Agenda
In logic, we introduce a sentential operator, ‘\(\wedge\)’, say that it means ‘and’, and assign it the following truth table:
| \(p\) | \(q\) | \(p \wedge q\) |
|---|---|---|
| T | T | T |
| T | F | F |
| F | T | F |
| F | F | F |
This implies that ‘\(p \wedge q\)’ and ‘\(q \wedge p\)’ mean the same thing.
Sally: “What’s the weather going to be like today?” Harold: “You should bring your umbrella.”
What does Harold say? What does he communicate?
A: “How is Charles getting on in his new job?” B: “Quite well, I think: he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet.”
What does B say? What does B communicate?
A basic observation about how we use language: we often communicate more than what we say.
Call these additional things that we communicate conversational implicatures.
Agenda
Conversation is a cooperative venture, aimed at communication. Conversational implicatures are generated by apparent violations of the cooperative norms that govern conversation.
Sally: “What’s the weather going to be like today?” Harold: “You should bring your umbrella.”
Which maxim(s) does Harold appear to violate?
A: “How is Charles getting on in his new job?” B: “Quite well, I think: he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet.”
Which maxim(s) does B appear to violate?
Except for implicatures that rely on the maxim of manner!
This implies that the implicature is a function of what is said, not something else.