Pornography as a Speech Act

David Sanson

2026-10-26

Historical Context

Agenda

Traditional Arguments

The Traditional Conservative Argument Against Pornography
Pornography should be banned because it is obscene and morally corrupting.
The Traditional Liberal Defense of a Right to Pornography
The state should not interfere with pornography, for three reasons: (1) to do so would violate freedom of speech; (2) to do so would violate the right to privacy; (3) pornography is relatively harmless.

Indianapolis Ordinance

In 1984, Indianapolis passes an ordinance, drafted by Catherine MacKinnon, that defines pornography as a civil rights violation against women, allowing women to sue pornographers for civil damages.

American Booksellers Inc vs. Hudnut

In 1985, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals (the one in Chicago), throws out the Indianapolis Ordinance. (The opinion was written by Judge Frank Easterbrook.)

MacKinnon’s Argument

Pornography should be banned because it violates the civil rights of women: (1) it violates their right to equal status; (2) it violates their right to free speech (by silencing them).

Definitions of Pornography

Agenda

“Know it when I see it”

“I can’t define pornography, but I know it when I see it.” (Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 US 184 (1964).

“Know it when I see it”

Definition 1
All sexually explicit material is pornography.
Definition 2
All sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers is pornography.
Definition 3
All sexually explicit material wholly or primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers is pornography.
Definition 4
Pornography is sexually explicit material that (a) wholly or primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers and (b) is morally bad.

Morally Bad?

In what way is pornography morally bad?

Traditional answer: it is obscene and morally corrupting.

We define pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and words that also includes (i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or pain; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest or other sexual assault; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up, cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or (vi) women’s body parts — including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks — are exhibited such that women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or (viii) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.

Langton

Agenda

Three Kinds of Speech Act

Locutionary Act
The act of saying something.
Illocutionary Act
The act you perform in saying something.
Perlocutionary Act
The act you perform by saying something.

Speech Acts and Free Speech

Easterbrook agrees with MacKinnon that pornography is an act that depicts subordination and tends to perpetuate subordination. But he throws out the ordinance on free speech grounds:

“The First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message [or] its ideas.”

But this involves a limited view about the uses of language.

Speech Acts and Free Speech

Pornography is not always done with words. Yet Easterbrook’s description exemplifies the tendency of which Austin complained. Pornography depicts subordination and causes it. That—in Austin’s terms—is to describe its locutionary and perlocutionary dimensions. What is missing is a description of the actions constituted by pornographic utterances: in Austin’s terms, pornography’s illocutionary force. MacKinnon supplies such a description when she says that pornography is an act of subordination. (Langton, 296)

Subordination and Silencing

Subordination
Pornography is an act of subordinating women.

Langton argues that this is the illocutionary act performed by the pornographer.

Silencing
Pornography silences women.

Langton argues that this is the perlocutionary act performed by the pornographer.

Subordination as Illocutionary Act

Is subordinating one of the things I can do in saying something?

  • hurting is perlocutionary: ‘I shoot her’ and you shoot her.
  • oppressing is perlocutionary: I say something racist, and thereby perpetuate racism.
  • but subordinating is illocutionary.

Subordination as Illocutionary Act

Blacks are not permitted to vote. (as uttered by a legislator in South Africa enacting apartheid.)

Whites only. (as posted on the door of a restaurant)

Subordination as Illocutionary Act

To subordinate a group is to:

  1. They unfairly rank members in that group as having inferior worth…
  2. …in a way that legitimates discrimationary behavior…
  3. …and unjustly deprives members of the group of important powers.

Subordination as Illocutionary Act

Questions:

  1. Does the pornographer have the right sort of authority to subordinate via pornographic speech? (this is about felicity conditions—analogy to the South African legislator)
  2. Does the pornographer’s speech act have the correct uptake to count as illocutionary subordination?
  3. Does pornography in fact have the perlocutionary effect of unjustly depriving a group of important powers?

Silencing

If you are powerful, you sometimes have the ability to silence the speech of the powerless. One way might be to stop the powerless from speaking at all. Gag them, threaten them, condemn them to solitary confinement. But there is another, less dramatic but equally effective, way. Let them speak. Let them say whatever they like to whomever they like, but stop that speech from […] counting as the action it was intended to be. Some speech acts are unspeakable for women in some contexts: although the appropriate words can be uttered, those utterances fail to count as the actions they were intended to be.

Silencing

Three kinds of silencing:

  • locutionary: make it so that someone does not speak (e.g., through intimidation or gagging)
  • perlocutionary frustration: your speech act does not have the intended effect on your audience.
  • illocutionary disablement: “although the appropriate words are uttered, with the appropriate intention, the speaker fails to perform the intended illocutionary act.”

Silencing

Example (i): Warning. This example is from Donald Davidson. Imagine this: the actor is acting a scene in which there is supposed to be a fire…. It is his role to imitate as persuasively as he can a man who is trying to warn others of a fire. “Fire!” he screams. And perhaps he adds, at the behest of the author, “I mean it! Look at the smoke !” etc. And now a real fire breaks out, and the actor tries vainly to warn the real audience. “Fire!” he screams. “I mean it! Look at the smoke!” etc.