Russell’s Theory
- The President of ISU wears hats
-
(a) There is a President of ISU
and (b) he is the only President of ISU
and (c) he wears hats.
So, when you use a definite description, you assert both (a) existence and (b) uniqueness.
Russell’s Theory
- The Governor of Illinois is a Republican
-
(a) There is a Governor of Illinois
and (b) he is the only Governor of Illinois
and (c) he is a Republican.
Russell’s Theory
- The Senator from Illinois is a Democrat
-
(a) There is a Senator from Illinois
and (b) they are the only Senator from Illinois
and (c) they are a Democrat.
Russell’s Theory
- The roller coaster in Uptown Normal is well-hidden
-
(a) There is a roller coaster in Uptown Normal
and (b) it is the only roller coaster in Uptown Normal
and (c) it is hard to find.
Russell’s Theory
- The professor at ISU is wearing a Aloha shirt:
- there is a professor at ISU and
- there is only one professor at ISU and
- they are wearing an Aloha shirt.
- The professor teaching PHI 205 is wearing a Aloha shirt.
- The desk in this classroom is broken.
- The piano in this classroom is in tune.
- The piano in this classroom is out of tune.
(1) The Author of Waverley
- (AW1) George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.
- (AW2) Scott is the author of Waverley.
- (AW3) So, George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott.
- (AW11) There is one and only one author of Waverley and George IV wished to know whether: Scott is he.
- (AW12) George IV wished to know whether: there is one and only one author of Waverley and Scott is he.
How does this solve the puzzle?
(2) The Present King of France
By the law of excluded middle, either “A is B” or “A is not B” must be true. Hence either “the present King of France is bald” or “the present King of France is not bald” must be true. Yet if we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the things that are not bald, we should not find the present King of France in either list.
- primary occurrence
-
- There is a preent king of France and (b) there is only one King of France and (c) he is not bald.
- secondary occurrence
-
It is not the case that ((a) there is a KoF and (b) only one present King of France and (c) he is bald).
How does this solve the puzzle?
(3) True Negative Existentials
- The round square does not exist.
- What does Frege’s theory say about (6)?
- What can Russell say about (6), using his distinction between primary and secondary occurrences?
Proper Names
Russell’s solution only works for definite descriptions. But what about:
- Apollo does not exist.
The whole realm of non-entities, such as “the round square,” “the even prime other than 2,” “Apollo,” “Hamlet,” etc., can now be satisfactorily dealt with. All these are denoting phrases which do not denote anything. A proposition about Apollo means what we get by substituting what the classical dictionary tells us is meant by Apollo, say “the sun-god”. All propositions in which Apollo occurs are to be interpreted by the above rules for denoting phrases. If “Apollo” has a primary occurrence, the proposition containing the occurrence is false; if the occurrence is secondary, the proposition may be true. (491)
- Russell thinks that all “ordinary names” in English are actually disguised definite descriptions.
Superman and Clark Kent
- (SM1) Lois believes that Superman flies.
- (SM2) Superman is Clark Kent.
- (SM3) So, Lois believes that Clark Kent flies.
This is structurally the same puzzle as Russell’s Scott/Waverley puzzle, but with proper names, not descriptions.
What is Russell’s solution?
Sherlock Holmes
By the law of excluded middle, either ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe’ is true, or its negation, ‘Sherlock Holmes does not smoke a pipe’ is true. But if you gather all the pipe-smokers together, Holmes will not be among them. And if you gather all the non-pipe smokers, he won’t be among those either.
What is Russell’s solution?
Logically Proper Names
- Elsewhere, Russell argues that we can only use logically proper names for objects that we are immediately acquainted with.
- His examples: ‘I’, referring to oneself, and ‘this’, referring to an item presently in your sensory field, like a patch of red in your visual field.
So what should he say about:
- I do not exist.
- This does not exist.
The Ontological Argument
- (OA1) The most perfect Being has all perfections.
- (OA2) Existence is a perfection.
- (OA3) So, the most perfect Being exists.
What does Russell’s theory tell us about (OA1)?