For this week, read Putnam (1973).
The first part of the paper, “Are Meanings in the Head?”, presents three examples. The examples are meant to establish that two speakers can use the same word and be in the same psychological state, but refer to different things. So intension (meaning, sense) does not determine extension (reference).
The first example is the “Twin Earth” thought experiment. This is a famous thought experiment that involves a bit of science fiction, imagining that there is a planet somewhere in the universe that is a lot like earth, but not quite the same. Speakers on this “Twin Earth” associate with the word ‘water’ the same intension we do, but it picks out a different chemical substance in their language than it does in ours.
The second example is a variant of the first, also involving a “Twin Earth”, but is about the words ‘aluminum’ and ‘molybdenum’ instead of the word ‘water’.
The third example does not involve any science fiction. It is just about ordinary speakers here on Earth who cannot tell the difference between a beech tree and an elm.
As you read this, and think about these examples, think about how they are related to the examples Kripke uses to argue against the “Frege-Russell” view.
The second part of the paper, “A Sociolinguistic Hypothesis”, suggests that the second and third example can be explained by appealing to a “division of linguistic labor”. Ordinary speakers are not responsible for being able to tell the difference between beech trees and elms, or between aluminum and molybdenum. We leave that to the experts.
As you read this, you might think about how it relates to the examples Kripke discusses, of ordinary speakers who cannot uniquely identify Cicero, Einstein, Aristotle, or Feynman, but nevertheless can use the names ‘Cicero’, ‘Einstein’, ‘Aristotle’, and ‘Feynman’ to refer to Cicero, Einstein, Aristotle, and Feynman.
The third part of the paper, “Indexicality and Rigidity”, returns to the first thought experiment, involving Twin Earth and ‘water’. This is the most complicated part of the paper. Putnam considers various views about how the word ‘water’ works across different circumstances and different possible worlds. He connects this to a Russell-like scope distinction, and also connects it to Kripke’s concept of a “rigid designator”. He then develops the idea that natural kind terms like ‘water’ have an indexical component—‘water’ means, roughly, the stuff in the oceans and rivers around here. And then he claims that this indexical account and Kripke’s rigid designator account are “two ways of making the same point”.
My reading advice:
- Focus first on the three thought experiments and what Putnam claims they show. Do you agree? Can you think of other ways of explaining the cases?
- Think about how the examples that Putnam gives here and the view he develops relates to the examples you saw in Kripke and the view he develops.