Appendix C — Arguments

About this Appendix

This appendix collects together the key arguments, thought experiments, and theses discussed in the book, in the order they appear in each chapter. Readers may find it helpful to have a printed copy of this appendix at hand, or have it open in a separate tab, while reading through the chapters.

Argument Forms

Appendix A describes a few common argument forms. They are repeated here for easy reference.

Modus Ponens

If P, then Q.
P.
So, Q.

Modus Tollens

If P then Q.
~Q.
So, ~P.

Chained Conditional

If P then Q.
If Q then R.
So, if P then R.

Universal Instantiation

All Fs are Gs.
o is F.
So, o is G

Introduction

Against Fearing Death

FD1. You cease to be conscious when you die.
FD2. If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn’t bad for you.
FD3. So, being dead isn’t bad for you.
FD4. If being dead isn’t bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death.
FD5. So, you shouldn’t fear death.

The Drinking Age Argument

DK1. Kristina is twenty years old.
DK2. If Kristina is twenty years old, then Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.
DK3. So, Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.

The Brain Death Argument

BD1. Your brain stops working when you die.
BD2. If your brain stops working when you die, then you cease to be conscious when you die.
FD1. So, you cease to be conscious when you die.

The Uncertain Fate Argument

UF1. You don’t know what will happen to you after you die.
UF2. If you don’t know what will happen to you after you die, then you should fear death.
UF3. So, you should fear death.

The Afterlife Argument

AF1. You go to heaven or hell after you die.
AF2. If you go to heaven or hell after you die, then you don’t cease to be conscious when you die.
AF3. So, you don’t cease to be conscious when you die.

The Beating Heart Argument

BH1. A six-week-old embryo has a beating heart.
BH2. It’s always immoral to kill something that has a beating heart.
BH3. So, it’s immoral to kill a six-week-old embryo.

The Consciousness Argument

CN1. A six-week-old embryo isn’t conscious.
CN2. It’s never wrong to kill something that isn’t conscious.
CN3. So, it isn’t wrong to kill a six-week-old embryo.

The Worm Argument

WA1. If it’s always immoral to kill something that has a beating heart, then it’s immoral to kill worms.
WA2. It isn’t immoral to kill worms.
WA3. So, it isn’t always immoral to kill something that has a beating heart.

The Temporary Anesthesia Argument

TA1. If it’s never wrong to kill something that’s unconscious, then it isn’t wrong to kill a temporarily anesthetized adult.
TA2. It is wrong to kill a temporarily anesthetized adult.
TA3. So, it is sometimes wrong to kill something that’s unconscious.

Hedonism (HD): Something is bad for you if and only if it’s painful.

VIGILANTE

Jasmine discovers that some con men have set up a fake charity and are conning some people in her neighborhood. She captures them at gunpoint, takes them to her basement, and plans to keep them there for a year as punishment. Quickly realizing how expensive it is to take care of them, Jasmine goes to her neighbors and demands $50 from each of them, at gunpoint. She explains that half the money will go towards taking care of her prisoners and that the rest will go towards a community gym to help keep troubled kids off the street. Those who do not comply are locked up in her basement with her other prisoners.

Against Taxation and Imprisonment

TX1. If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A and B, and A is wrong, then B is wrong.
TX2. It is wrong for Jasmine to extort and kidnap her neighbors.
TX3. There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine extorting and kidnapping her neighbors and the government taxing and imprisoning its citizens.
TX4. So, it is wrong for the government to tax and imprison its citizens.

The Argument for Freedom

FR1. Sometimes you perform an action after deciding to perform that action.
FR2. If one performs an action after deciding to perform it, then one performs that action freely.
FR3. So some of your actions are performed freely.

HYPNOTIC DECISION

Tia is on the run from the law and knows the cops are hot on her trail. She is also a master hypnotist. As she passes Colton on the street, she hypnotizes him and plants an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion: whenever he hears someone shout Freeze! he will grow very angry with the person, decide to tackle them, and then tackle them. Just then, Kabir the cop arrives on the scene, sees Tia, and shouts Freeze! As a result of the hypnotic suggestion, Colton gets angry at Kabir, consciously decides to tackle him, and then tackles him.

TROLLEY LEVER

A runaway trolley with no driver is hurtling down the tracks towards five pledges from a local fraternity. Corrine is an onlooker, standing beside the tracks. Next to her is a lever which can divert the trolley onto a side track. She could do nothing, and let the pledges die. But if she pulls the lever and diverts the trolley, it will kill the pledge master, who is asleep on the side track. Corrine decides to pull the lever, killing the pledge master and saving the pledges. She then unties the pledges, and they all go on to lead long, happy lives.

C.1 Can God Allow Suffering?

The Argument from Suffering

AS1. There is suffering in the world.
AS2. If there is suffering in the world, then God does not exist.
AS3. So, God does not exist.

Omnibeing: An omnibeing is a being that is omnipotent (maximally powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and omnibenevolent (morally perfect).

The Argument from Pointless Suffering

PS1. There is pointless suffering in the world.
PS2. If there is pointless suffering in the world, then there is no omnibeing.
PS3. So, there is no omnibeing.

The Argument for Disbelief

DB1. You should not believe that all the suffering in Nornia is necessary for some unknown greater good that its ruler has in mind.
DB2. If you should not believe that all the suffering in Nornia is necessary for some unknown greater good that its ruler has in mind, then you should not believe that all the suffering in the actual world is necessary for some unknown greater good that an omnibeing has in mind.
DB3. So, you should not believe that all the suffering in the actual world is necessary for some unknown greater good that an omnibeing has in mind.

C.2 Why You Should Bet on God

Expected Utility: The expected utility of an action is a measure of how well you should expect to do if you choose a given option. Multiply the value of each outcome by its likelihood, and take the sum of those products.

The Argument for Confessing Feelings

CF1. One should always choose the option with the greatest expected utility.
CF2. Confessing your feelings has a greater expected utility than not confessing.
CF3. So, you should confess your feelings.

The Argument for Betting on God

BG1. One should always choose the option with the greatest expected utility.
BG2. Believing in God has a greater expected utility than not believing in God.
BG3. So you should believe in God.

The Argument for Trying to Believe

TB1. One should always choose the option with the greatest expected utility.
TB2. Making an effort to believe in God has greater expected utility than not making an effort to believe in God.
TB3. So, one should make an effort to believe in God.

C.3 What Makes You You

Template of an Account: $A$ at time $t$ is the same person as $B$ at time $t^*$ if and only if ______.

LEAVE NO TRACE

After robbing the mansion, Bekah realizes that she may have left some fingerprints behind. To help ensure that the police can’t prove that she was the burglar, she soaks her fingers in acid, completely searing off her fingerprints. The police track her down and, just as she hoped, they are unable to prove that she committed the burglary.

The Fingerprints Account: $A$ at time $t$ is the same person as $B$ at time $t^*$ if and only if $A$ and $B$ have indistinguishable fingerprints.

The DNA Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if $A$ and $B$ have indistinguishable DNA.

The Same Body Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if $A$ has the same body as $B$.

The Psychological Matching Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if A’s psychological features are exactly the same as B’s psychological features.

The Psychological Overlap Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if A’s psychological features are mostly the same as B’s psychological features.

The Psychological Descendant Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if $A$ is either a psychological ancestor or a psychological descendant of $B$.

The Conjoined Twins Argument

CT1. If the Same Body Account is true, then either Abby and Brittany have different bodies or Abby and Brittany are the same person.
CT2. Abby and Brittany have the same body.
CT3. Abby and Brittany are not the same person.
CT4. So, the Same Body Account is false.

CONJOINED DRAMA

Abby is dating Arie. Brittany is secretly in love with Arie and has always been jealous of their relationship. One night, while Abby is sleeping, Brittany confesses her feelings to Arie, and Arie kisses her. Later, when Abby finds out, she strangles Brittany.

BODY SWAP

Rachel is a neurotechnologist. Using an fMRI, a supercomputer, and advanced laser technology, she has devised a way to get a complete neuron-for-neuron scan of one person’s brain, and then rewire a second person’s brain to be an exact duplicate of it. She recruits a pair of volunteers to have their wiring “swapped” for a day: a man named Raúl and a woman named June. Rachel’s team performs the procedure on Tuesday night, and the volunteers are awakened on Wednesday. Both stare down at their bodies in disbelief. The person with the male body says ‘my name is June’ and can recount all of June’s memories but knows nothing at all about Raúl’s past. The person with the female body says ‘my name is Raúl’ and can tell you all about Raúl’s past but nothing about June’s.

The Body Swap Argument

BS1. MaleT and MaleW have the same body.
BS2. If MaleT and MaleW have the same body, then: if the Same Body Account is true, then MaleT and MaleW are the same person.
BS3. MaleT and MaleW are not the same person.
BS4. So, the Same Body Account is false.

TOTAL AMNESIA

Jiwoo is stranded on a deserted island. Adding injury to insult, a coconut fell on Jiwoo’s head at noon today, instantly resulting in total amnesia. She can’t remember how she got on the island or anything else about her past. She can’t even remember her own name.

TOTAL BLACKOUT

Minjun is stranded on a deserted island. Adding injury to insult, a coconut fell on Minjun’s head at noon today, temporarily knocking him unconscious. While unconscious, he is not dreaming, nor does he have any thoughts or experiences or any physical sensations whatsoever. He is completely blacked out. When he finally awakens hours later, it will feel as if no time has passed.

The Blackout Argument

BL1. The unconscious man is not a psychological descendant of the conscious man.
BL2. If the unconscious man is not a psychological descendant of the conscious man, then: if the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then the conscious man is not the same person as the unconscious man.
BL3. The conscious man is the same person as the unconscious man.
BL4. So, the Psychological Descendant Account is false.

DOUBLE TROUBLE

Rachel’s rewiring program has been tremendously successful, and she is now performing dozens of body swaps a day. But she’s starting to get a little sloppy. Today, after rewiring Chad’s brain to duplicate JoJo’s, Rachel then accidentally rewires Alex’s brain to duplicate JoJo’s as well. As a result, both the person with Chad’s original body and the person with Alex’s original body wake up and say ‘my name is JoJo’. Both can tell you all about JoJo’s past; neither can tell you anything about Chad or Alex’s past. Rachel’s team also accidently obliterates JoJo’s original body.

The Fission Argument

FS1. If the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then JoJo is the same person as ChadRW and is the same person as AlexRW.
FS2. If JoJo is the same person as ChadRW and the same person as AlexRW, then ChadRW is the same person as AlexRW.
FS3. So, if the Psychological Descendant Account is true, then ChadRW is the same person as AlexRW.
FS4. ChadRW is not the same person as AlexRW.
FS5. So the Psychological Descendant Account is false.

The No Difference Principle (NDP): If $A$ is numerically the same as B, then at any given time, anything that’s true of $A$ at that time is also true of $B$ at that time.

The Same Soul Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if $A$ has the same soul as $B$.

The Body-And-Mind Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if $A$ has the same body as $B$ and $A$ is a psychological ancestor or descendant of $B$.

The Body-Or-Mind Account: $A$ at $t$ is the same person as $B$ at $t^*$ if and only if $A$ has the same body as $B$ or $A$ is a psychological ancestor or descendant of $B$.

C.4 Don’t Fear the Reaper

Against Fearing Death

FD1. You cease to be conscious when you die.
FD2. If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not bad for you.
FD3. So, being dead is not bad for you.
FD4. If being dead is not bad for you, then you should not fear death.
FD5. So, you should not fear death.

Hedonism (HD): Something is bad for you if and only if it’s painful.

Hedonism (HD*): Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you would otherwise have had.

The Argument from Hedonism

AH1. If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead doesn’t result in more pain than you would otherwise have had.
AH2. Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you would otherwise have had.
FD2. So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn’t bad for you.

STOLEN CRUISE

Brendan is about to go on a week-long cruise. His girlfriend, Pieper, serves him undercooked chicken, in hopes that he’ll get food poisoning and will let her go in his place. Pieper’s plan succeeds, and she has a great time on the cruise. She comes back refreshed, relaxed, and feeling no remorse whatsoever.

Hedonism (HD**): Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain or less pleasure than you would otherwise have had.

UNREAD MAIL

Carly meets Evan, and they immediately fall in love. Because things are going so well with Evan, Carly stops checking her online dating app. They have a long and entirely happy life together. It so happens that Jami had sent Carly a message shortly after Carly met Evan. If she hadn’t met Evan, she would have seen Jami’s message, fallen in love with her, and she and Jami would have had a long and happy life together. As a matter of fact, she would have been a little tiny bit happier with Jami than with Evan.

The Unread Mail Argument

UM1. Carly would have had more pleasure had she not met Evan.
UM2. If Carly would have had more pleasure had she not met Evan, then: if HD** is true, then meeting Evan was bad for her.
UM3. Meeting Evan was not bad for her.
UM4. So, HD** is false.

Against Post-Mortem Consciousness

PC1. If Animal ceases to be conscious when you die and you are Animal, then you cease to be conscious when you die.
PC2. Animal ceases to be conscious when you die.
PC3. You are Animal.
FD1. So, you cease to be conscious when you die.

The Too Many Thinkers Argument

TT1. Animal is in your chair and is thinking.
TT2. You are the only thing in your chair that is thinking.
PC3. So you are Animal.

C.5 No Freedom

The Argument for Freedom

FR1. Sometimes you perform an action after deciding to perform that action.
FR2. If one performs an action after deciding to perform it, then one performs that action freely.
FR3. So some of your actions are performed freely.

HYPNOTIC ACTION

Tia is on the run from the law and knows the cops are hot on her trail. She is also a master hypnotist. As she passes Jordan on the street, she hypnotizes him and plants an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion: whenever he hears someone shout Freeze! he will fall into a hypnotic trance and tackle the person who said it. Just then, Kabir the cop arrives on the scene, sees Tia, shouts Freeze!, and Jordan tackles him.

HYPNOTIC DECISION

The Desire Argument

DS1. What you choose to do is always determined by your desires.
DS2. You can’t control your desires.
DS3. So, what you choose to do is always determined by something you can’t control.
DS4. If what you choose to do is always determined by something you can’t control, then you never act freely.
DS5. So, you never act freely.

The Argument from Undesired Action

UA1. Your desire to stay in bed was stronger than your desire to get out of bed.
UA2. If your desire to stay in bed was stronger than your desire to get out of bed, then what you choose to do is not always determined by your desires.
UA3. So, what you choose to do is not always determined by your desires.

The Argument from Desire-Defeating Action

DD1. Your desires can be changed by performing desire-defeating actions.
DD2. If your desires can be changed by performing desire-defeating actions, then you can control your desires.
DD3. So, you can control your desires.

The Argument from Determinism

DT1. Determinism is true.
DT2. If determinism is true, then you are never able to do otherwise.
DT3. If you are never able to do otherwise, then none of your actions are free.
DT4. So, none of your actions are free.

The Doomed Regardless Argument

DM1. If an action is determined to happen, then you couldn’t have done otherwise.
DM2. If you couldn’t have done otherwise, then the action is not free.
DM3. So, if an action is determined to happen, then it is not free.
DM4. If an action happens randomly, then it is not free.
DM5. Every action you perform is either determined to happen or happens randomly.
DM6. So, none of your actions are free.

The Argument from Determinism

DT1. Determinism is true.
DT2. If determinism is true, then you are never able to do otherwise.
DT3. If you are never able to do otherwise, then none of your actions are free.
DT4. So, none of your actions are free.

The Consequence Argument

CQ1. If determinism is true, then what you do is always a consequence of the laws of nature and the distant past.
CQ2. You have no control over the laws of nature or the distant past
CQ3. So, if determinism is true, then what you do is always a consequence of things over which you have no control.
CQ4. If what you do is always a consequence of things over which you have no control, then you are never able to do otherwise (DT2) So, if determinism is true, you are never able to do otherwise.

HYPNOTIC BACKUP

Tia the master hypnotist is on the run from the law and hires Clay to tackle any cop who turns up. Concerned that Clay might betray her, Tia gives Clay an irresistible post-hypnotic suggestion to tackle any cop he sees, but which will kick in only if she triggers it by shouting Abracadabra! When Kabir the cop arrives on the scene, Tia keeps a watchful eye on Clay to see if he’s going to back out. But Clay comes through: he decides to tackle Kabir all on his own, without Tia having to trigger the post-hypnotic suggestion that would have forced him to tackle Kabir.

The Argument from Determined Decision

DT1. Determinism is true.
DT2*. If determinism is true, then you are never able to decide to do otherwise.
DT3*. If you are never able to decide to do otherwise, then none of your actions are free.
DT4. So, none of your actions are free.

C.6 You Know Nothing

Future Like Past (FLP): Future states of the world will be like past states of the world.

Against Knowing the Future

KF1. If you are not justified in believing that FLP is true, then your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified.
KF2. You are not justified in believing that FLP is true.
KF3. So, your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified.
KF4. If your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified, then you don’t know that the sun will set in the west tomorrow.
KF5. So, you don’t know that the sun will set in the west tomorrow.

The Faulty Foundation Argument

FF1. Your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is based on FLP.
FF2. If a belief is based on something that you aren’t justified in believing, then that belief itself is unjustified.
KF1. So, if you are not justified in believing that FLP is true, then your belief that the sun will set in the west tomorrow is unjustified.

Future Like Past in Expected Ways (FLP*): Future states of the world will be like past states of the world except in respects in which we can expect them to differ.

POWER POSE

Jared is getting ready for a job interview, and thinks it will help his chances if he spends five minutes “power posing” in front of the mirror. When his fiancée Ashley asks him why he thinks that will help, Jared tells her that scientists have shown that power posing releases performance-enhancing hormones into your bloodstream. Skeptical, Ashley does some Googling and informs Jared that the power-posing study has been completely discredited and is now widely regarded as “pseudo-science.”

FLP is Unjustified

UJ1. If your belief in FLP is justified, then it is either justified by direct observation or by inductive reasoning.
UJ2. Your belief in FLP isn’t justified by direct observation.
UJ3. Your belief in FLP isn’t justified by inductive reasoning.
KF2. So, your belief in FLP is unjustified.

The Anti-Circularity Argument

AC1. All inductive reasoning about the future assumes the truth of FLP.
AC2. If all inductive reasoning about the future assumes the truth of FLP, then any inductive reasoning about FLP is circular.
AC3. No belief can be justified by circular reasoning.
UJ3. So, FLP isn’t justified by inductive reasoning.

MAGIC 8-BALL

Madhu shakes up his Magic 8-Ball, asks whether Smitha has a crush on him, and it issues its verdict: yes. Madhu’s excitement lasts only for a moment, as he suddenly realizes that he has no reason to believe that the 8-ball can be trusted. So, he decides to check. He shakes up the 8- Ball, asks it whether it can be trusted, and it issues its verdict: yes. “That settles it,” Madhu thinks to himself, “the 8-ball can be trusted, and Smitha does have a crush on me!”

The Dreaming Hypothesis (TDH): You are currently lying down in bed dreaming about sitting down reading a philosophy textbook.

The Dreaming Argument

DR1. If you have no way of knowing that TDH is false, then you don’t know that you’re sitting down reading.
DR2. You have no way of knowing that TDH is false.
DR3. So you don’t know that you’re sitting down reading.

The Competing Hypotheses Argument

CH1. One knows a certain thing only if one has some way of knowing that all competing hypotheses are false.
CH2. TDH is a hypothesis that competes with your belief that you’re sitting down reading.
DR1. So, if you have no way of knowing that TDH is false, then you don’t know that you’re sitting down reading.

The Argument from Deduction

DE1. If you know you’re sitting down reading, then you can deduce that TDH is false from things you know.
DE2. If you can deduce something from things you know, then you have a way of knowing that thing.
DE3. So, if you know you’re sitting down reading, then you have a way of knowing that TDH is false.

Argument

DE3. If you know you’re sitting down reading, then you have a way of knowing that TDH is false.
DR1. If you have no way of knowing that TDH is false, then you don’t know that you’re sitting down reading.

The No Evidence Argument

NE1. If you have no evidence against something, then you have no way of knowing it’s false.
NE2. You have no evidence against TDH.
DR2. So, you have no way of knowing that TDH is false.

The Flipped Evidence Argument

FE1. If you have no evidence for something, then you have no way of knowing it’s true.
FE2. You have no evidence for TDH.
FE3. So, you have no way of knowing that TDH is true.

The Vivid Dreaming Hypothesis (TDH+): You are currently lying down in bed dreaming about sitting down reading a philosophy textbook, and it’s the most incredibly vivid dream you’ve ever had.

The No Useful Tests Argument

NU1. If you don’t know that a dreaming test is reliable, then you can’t know whether you’re dreaming by using it.
NU2. You can never know that a dreaming test is reliable.
NU3. So, you can never know whether you’re dreaming by using a dreaming test.

C.7 Against Prisons and Taxes

VIGILANTE

Against Taxation and Imprisonment

TX1. If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A and B, and A is wrong, then B is wrong.
TX2. It is wrong for Jasmine to extort and kidnap her neighbors.
TX3. There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine extorting and kidnapping her neighbors and the government taxing and imprisoning its citizens.
TX4. So, it is wrong for the government to tax and imprison its citizens.

BUREAUCRATIC VIGILANTE

Jasmine sends an email to all of her neighbors, informing them that they must each send her $50 by April 15; that if they don’t, they’ll automatically be granted an extension, but will be charged a small late fee; and that if they still don’t pay, she will lock them in her basement. Some don’t pay even by the extended deadline, and she shows up at their door, escorts them to her home at gunpoint, and locks them in her basement.

ELECTED VIGILANTE

Jasmine plans to start taking prisoners and demanding $50 at gunpoint from each of her neighbors to pay for the prisoners and a gym. Zhiwen thinks it would be better to demand $75, with the additional $25 going towards hiring a nurse to provide free medical care to anyone in the neighborhood. Jasmine and Zhiwen let their neighbors vote on which of them should get to set the policies for kidnapping and extortion. Many don’t vote but, of those who do, the majority prefer Jasmine. Zhiwen accepts the results of the election, and Jasmine begins kidnapping and extorting her neighbors.

SAINT AND SINNER

A saint and a sinner both need a kidney transplant, but there is only one kidney available. The saint refuses it and insists that it be given to the sinner. The doctor, knowing that the world will be better off if the saint survives than if the sinner survives, forcibly anesthetizes the saint and gives her the kidney against her wishes and without her consent. The saint (who would otherwise have died) goes on to live a long life and does many saintly things.

LANDLORD

Jasmine owns an apartment complex and discovers that some of her tenants have been conning some of the other tenants. She locks the con men in the basement of the complex, and plans to keep them there for a year as punishment. Jasmine then demands an additional $50 from each of her other tenants, to cover the expense of caring of her prisoners. Tenants who do not comply are locked in the basement with the other prisoners.

No Consent

NC1. Someone tacitly consents to an arrangement only if (i) there is a reasonable way to opt out and (ii) explicit refusal to opt in is recognized.
NC2. There is no reasonable way to opt out of paying taxes and following laws, and explicit refusal to opt in is not recognized.
NC3. So, we have not tacitly consented to paying taxes and following laws.

UNWANTED VISITORS

Jasmine and her friends arrive at their neighborhood park for their weekly soccer game, only to find a group from another neighborhood already using the park for a game of their own. Guns drawn, she directs them into her van, drives them back to their own neighborhood, and threatens to lock them in her basement if they ever return without first getting her permission. Some do ask for her permission, and most of the time she refuses. Some return without her permission, and she locks them in her basement.

The Argument for Open Borders

OB1. If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A and B, and A is wrong, then B is wrong.
OB2. It is wrong for Jasmine to restrict access to the park.
OB3. There is no morally relevant difference between Jasmine restricting access to the park and the government restricting access to the country.
OB4. So, it is wrong for the government to restrict access to the country.

C.8 The Ethics of Abortion

UNWANTED PREGNANCY

Taylor just discovered that she is pregnant with Emm, a six-week-old embryo. The pregnancy resulted from consensual, casual sex. Taylor didn’t want to get pregnant, and her partner wore a condom, but they were aware that condoms sometimes break, which is what happened in this case. Both Taylor and Emm are healthy, and carrying out the pregnancy will not pose any threat to Taylor’s life. Even so, Taylor knows that going through with the pregnancy will be a huge burden physically, emotionally, and financially. So, Taylor decides to have an abortion, killing Emm.

The X-Schema

X1. Emm is (or has) X.
X2. It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that is (or has)
X3. So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Y-Schema

Y1. Emm isn’t Y.
Y2. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is Y.
Y3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Rationality

YR1. Emm isn’t rational.
YR2. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is rational.
YR3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Self-Sufficiency

YS1. Emm isn’t self-sufficient.
YS2. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is self-sufficient.
YS3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Being Unwanted

YU1. Emm isn’t wanted.
YU2. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it is wanted.
YU3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Attachment

YA1. Emm is attached to another human.
YA2. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it isn’t attached to any other human.
YA3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

A Revised Argument from Attachment

YA1*. Emm is bodily-attached to another human.
YA2*. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it isn’t bodilyattached to any other human.
YA3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Consciousness

YC1. Emm is not conscious.
YC2. It’s seriously immoral to kill something only if it’s conscious.
YC3. So it’s not seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Life

XL1. Emm is alive.
XL2. It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that’s alive.
XL3. So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Human DNA

XD1. Emm has human DNA.
XD2. It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that has human DNA.
XD3. So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Hearts

XH1. Emm has a beating heart.
XH2. It’s always seriously immoral to kill something that has a beating heart.
XH3. So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Argument from Potentiality

XP1. Emm is a potential person.
XP2. It’s always seriously immoral to kill a potential person.
XP3. So it’s seriously immoral to kill Emm.

The Right to Life Argument

RL1. Emm has a right to life.
RL2. If Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb.
RL3. So, it’s seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb.

The Requirements of Life Argument

RQ1. If something (or someone) has a right to life, and it needs a certain something in order to survive, then it has a right to that thing.
RQ2. Emm needs Taylor’s womb in order to survive.
RQ3. So, if Emm has a right to life, then Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb.
RQ4. If Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb, then it is seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb.
RL2. So, if Emm has a right to life, then it is seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb.

THE VIOLINIST

During his morning jog, Riley is kidnapped and drugged. When he comes to, he finds himself lying in a hospital bed, connected by some blood-filled tubes to a woman in a separate bed. His kidnappers explain that the woman, Maurissa, is a world-famous violinist. She was found unconscious, and they are trying to save her life. Maurissa is in need of a complete blood transfusion—already underway, using Riley’s blood—which will take nine months. Riley is told that if he unplugs himself from Maurissa before the transfusion is complete, she will die immediately. When the kidnappers leave the room, Riley sees his chance to escape. With a heavy heart, he unplugs himself and sneaks away, and Maurissa dies as expected.

THE ROCK

You have become completely obsessed with People Magazine’s 2016 Sexiest Man of the Year, Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson. So obsessed, in fact, that the thought of living without him makes you physically ill. Deathly ill. At this point, the only thing that can save your life is the touch of The Rock’s cool hand on your fevered brow. The Rock is notified, and told that you will die if he does not come visit you in the next few days. But The Rock is a busy man and he sends his regrets. You die, as expected.

The Violinist Argument

VA1. Maurissa has a right to life and needs Riley’s blood in order to survive.
VA2. Maurissa does not have a right to Riley’s blood.
VA3. So, someone who has a right to life does not thereby have a right to all the things they need in order to survive.

The Known Risk Argument

KR1. Taylor freely chose to have sex and knew that this could lead to Emm using her womb.
KR2. Whenever someone freely does something and knows that it could lead to certain consequences, one consents to those consequences.
KR3. So, Taylor consented to Emm using her womb.
KR4. If Taylor consented to Emm using her womb, then Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb.
KR5. If Emm has a right to Taylor’s womb, then it is seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb.
KR6. So, it is seriously immoral to deprive Emm of Taylor’s womb.

OPEN WINDOW

Astrid lives in a dangerous neighborhood with lots of hooligans. She has bars on her windows and keeps the windows closed and latched as an extra precaution. One hot summer day, she opens the windows to get some cool air, trusting that the bars will keep the hooligans out (though knowing that they are not 100% reliable). Unfortunately, the bars are defective. Some hooligans pull them off, climb through the window, plant themselves on her couch, and start playing her PlayStation.

The Simple FLO Argument

SF1. It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it deprives it of a future like ours.
SF2. Killing Emm deprives Emm of a future like ours.
SF3. So, it is seriously immoral to kill Emm.

HOPEFUL GONER

Guillermo has accidentally ingested a deadly poison and is in horrible, debilitating pain. He thinks he’ll get better, but he’s wrong: the poison is quickly spreading through his body and will kill him within a few hours. Nadja, who finds Guillermo terribly annoying and would like to see him dead as soon as possible, is attempting to inject Guillermo with a substance that will kill him instantly and painlessly. Guillermo resists and pleads for Nadja to stop. But Nadja gives Guillermo the injection, despite his protests, and Guillermo dies mere hours before the poison would have killed him anyway.

The Contraception Argument

CC1. Killing sperm deprives them of a future like ours.
CC2. If killing sperm deprives them of a future like ours, then: if SF1 is true, then it is seriously immoral to kill sperm.
CC3. It isn’t seriously immoral to kill sperm.
CC4. So, SF1 is false.

The Revised Contraception Argument

CC1*. Killing sperm prevents the creation of a being with FLO.
CC2*. If killing sperm prevents the creation of a being with FLO, then: if SF1 is true, then it is seriously immoral to kill sperm.
CC3. It isn’t seriously immoral to kill sperm.
CC4. So, SF1 is false.

CRUEL GAME

M’Baku is preparing to detonate an atomic bomb in the heart of a densely populated city. He has kidnapped two innocent people, Okoye and Shuri, and he commands Okoye to kill Shuri. If she complies, he will release Okoye and won’t detonate the bomb. If she refuses, he will release both of them and detonate the bomb, killing hundreds of thousands of people. Okoye tries to find a way to stop the detonation without killing Shuri, but M’Baku has thought of everything. So, with a heavy heart, Okoye kills Shuri.

The Modified FLO Argument

MF1. It is seriously immoral to kill something (or someone) if killing it deprives it of a future like ours and the killing does not involve any FLO-overriding factors.
MF2. Killing Emm deprives Emm of a future like ours.
MF3. Killing Emm does not involve any FLO-overriding factors.
MF4. So, it is seriously immoral to kill Emm.

RUNNER-UP

Krystal has struggled for years to make it as an actress, and finally gets her big audition. If she gets the role, it will catapult her into fame and fortune. As it turns out, Jacqueline gets the role. But Krystal is the runner-up and is told that if anything should happen to Jacqueline, the role will go to her. So, Krystal discreetly kills Jacqueline and gets the role.

QUICKSAND

Ahmed is drowning in quicksand. He has gotten ahold of Omar’s pantleg, and is frantically trying to pull himself out. But in doing so he is pulling Omar into the quicksand. Ahmed is in such a panicked state that he doesn’t realize what he is doing, and Omar’s pleas fall on deaf ears. Unless Omar stops him by pushing him under, Ahmed will pull him in and scramble out over Omar’s subsumed body, killing him. So, with a heavy heart, and in order to save his own life, Omar kills Ahmed by pushing him under.

ROCK FORCED

The only thing that can save your life is the touch of The Rock’s cool hand on your fevered brow. As it happens, The Rock is passing through the hospital where you lay dying. You ask for his help and he refuses. You grab his hand, but he pulls it away.

C.9 Eating Animals is Immoral

The Argument from Precedent

PR1. There have been people who eat meat throughout human history.
PR2. If there have been people doing a certain thing throughout human history, then it is morally permissible for you to do it.
PR3. So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat.

The Argument from Majority Precedent

PR1*. Most people have eaten meat throughout human history.
PR2*. If most people have done a certain thing throughout human history, then it is morally permissible for you to do it.
PR3. So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat.

The Natural Order Argument

NO1. Other animals eat meat.
NO2. If other animals do something, then it’s morally permissible for you to do it.
NO3. So, it’s morally permissible for you to eat meat.

The Natural Capacity Argument

CP1. You are naturally capable of eating meat.
CP2. If you are naturally capable of doing a certain thing, then it is morally permissible for you to do that thing.
CP3. So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat.

The Necessity of Protein Argument

NP1. Eating meat is necessary for getting enough protein.
NP2. If doing something is necessary for getting enough protein, then it is morally permissible for you to do it.
NP3. So, it is morally permissible for you to eat meat.

COCOAMONE FARM

As a result of a head injury, Fred’s brain stops naturally producing cocoamone, the hormone that enables humans to taste chocolate. Fred discovers that the only way to obtain useable cocoamone is to distill it from the brains of puppies. (The science behind this is very complicated and you wouldn’t understand it.) So Fred buys twenty Labrador puppies from a local breeder. He slices off their tails, yanks out their canine teeth, and castrates the males, all without anesthesia. He keeps them locked in small cages in his spare bedroom, slaughters them, grinds up their brains, and distills a month’s supply of cocoamone. He sips some cocoamone and—voilà—it works! So he buys twenty more puppies for the next month’s supply, mutilates them, and locks them up.

The Argument from Fred’s Puppies

FP1. If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A and B, and A is immoral, then B is immoral.
FP2. What Fred does is immoral.
FP3. There is no morally relevant difference between what Fred does and you buying and eating factory-farmed meat.
FP4. So, it is immoral for you to buy and eat factory-farmed meat.

BRED FOR COCOAMONE

Fred goes to a breeder and buys some dogs, some male and some female. Recognizing that these dogs were bred to be human companions, he treats them well. But he breeds the dogs, intending to use their puppies for cocoamone. Once they have their puppies—which weren’t bred for human companionship—he takes the puppies, locks them in cages, mutilates them, slaughters them, and distills their cocoamone.

HIRED HELP

Too squeamish to mutilate and slaughter the dogs himself, Fred hires Nysha to do it for him. She buys twenty dogs, mutilates them, keeps them confined in small cages, slaughters them, and provides Fred with one vial of cocoamone each month. He pays her for her services.

SECOND DESSERT

Fred decides not to start his own cocoamone farm, and has now gone months without tasting chocolate. Out to dinner, for old times’ sake, he orders a chocolate mousse for dessert. To his surprise, he is able to taste the chocolate. Elated, he calls the waiter over to order a second mousse and asks if there’s something special about it. The waiter explains that, yes, the mousse is infused with cocoamone from the brains of slaughtered, mutilated puppies that they keep caged up in the back. They go through twenty puppies a day, he says. Fred is horrified. But he does not cancel his order, and he enjoys a second cocoamone-infused mousse.

SWEATY PUPPIES

Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone, and the only way to obtain useable cocoamone is to distill it from the sweat of puppies. He asks his friends if he can collect sweat off of their puppies, but they think that’s creepy and won’t let him do it. So he buys twenty puppies, locks them in cages, mutilates them, collects their sweat, and distills a month’s supply of cocoamone.

PAINLESS DEATH

Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone, and the only way to obtain useable cocoamone is to distill it from the brains of puppies. So he buys twenty puppies, lets them run around free in his apartment, takes them for walks, buys them toys, and treats them well. Then, once they’re a year old, he sneaks up on them one by one, swiftly decapitates them, grinds up their brains, and distills a month’s supply of cocoamone.

HAPPY PUPPY SWEAT

Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone, and the only way to obtain useable cocoamone is to distill it from the sweat of puppies. So he buys twenty puppies, lets them run around free in his apartment, takes them for walks, buys them toys, and treats them well. He collects their sweat—without killing them or harming them in any way—and distills a month’s supply of cocoamone.

COCOAMONE LAB

Fred’s brain stops producing cocoamone. So he buys a hundred small clusters of brain cells that were painlessly extracted from living puppies without harming those puppies in any way. He keeps the cells alive in a chemical solution, and collects the cocoamone that they produce.

C.10 What Makes Things Right

Act Utilitarianism: Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it will have a more positive effect on overall levels of happiness than any other available action

TERRORIST ATTACK

Kristian discovers that her girlfriend Demi is planning a terrorist attack. Kristian knows that if she calls the cops on Demi, it will end their relationship, Demi will never forgive her, and she’ll feel incredibly guilty about turning Demi in. Kristian also knows that if she doesn’t tell the cops, countless people will lose their lives or their loved ones. Kristian decides not to tell the cops, and Demi carries out the devastating attack. Demi is never caught. Kristian puts it out of her mind and feels no guilt or remorse about not preventing the attack.

CONDONED LOBOTOMIES

The leaders of a certain oppressive country instituted a law that requires all newborn girls to be lobotomized. Dissenters were lobotomized as well. After a few generations, there are no more dissenters. The men are all happy with the arrangement, and the women are all lobotomized and have no opinion on the matter.

ORGAN DISTRIBUTION

Jonathan is a doctor, and his patient Nick is coming in for a routine physical. Looking over his past bloodwork, Jonathan realizes that Nick’s organs are an exact match for five patients in critical condition upstairs in the Intensive Care Unit. When Nick arrives, Jonathan kills him (painlessly), making it look like an accident. Since Nick is an organ donor, his body is rushed upstairs, and his heart, lungs, liver, and each of his kidneys are successfully transplanted into those five patients, saving their lives. No other organs arrived that day, and the five patients would have died had Jonathan not killed Nick for his organs. The five patients all go on to lead long, happy lives. No one ever finds out that Nick’s death was not an accident.

The Organ Distribution Argument

OD1. Killing Nick has a greater positive effect on overall levels of happiness than letting him live.
OD2. If killing Nick has a greater positive effect on overall levels of happiness than letting him live, then: if act utilitarianism is true, then killing Nick was the right thing to do.
OD3. Killing Nick was not the right thing to do.
OD4. So, act utilitarianism is false.

Rule Utilitarianism: Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it is prescribed by the collection of rules that, if adopted, would have the greatest positive effect on overall levels of happiness

TROLLEY DRIVER

Corrine is driving a trolley, which is hurtling down the tracks, faster than it should. Five pledges from a local fraternity have been tied to the tracks as part of an initiation ritual. By the time she sees them, it’s too late to slow down. The only way to avoid killing them is to swerve the trolley onto a side track at an upcoming junction. But the pledge master, who is asleep on the side track, will be killed if she does. Corrine decides to steer the trolley onto the side track anyway, killing the pledge master. She then stops the trolley, unties the pledges, and they all go on to lead long, happy lives.

The Trolley Argument

TR1. If there is no morally relevant difference between two actions A and B, and A is the right thing to do, then B is the right thing to do.
TR2. Diverting the trolley was the right thing to do.
TR3. There is no morally relevant difference between diverting the trolley and killing Nick.
TR4. So, killing Nick was the right thing to do.

TROLLEY LEVER

C.11 Logic

The Cuteness Argument

CA1. Camilla is cute.
CA2. It’s wrong to eat cute things.
CA3. So, it’s wrong to eat Camilla.

The Feathers Argument

FA1. Camilla has feathers.
FA2. Feathers are soft.
FA3. So, it’s wrong to eat Camilla.

Validity: An argument is valid just in case the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion: it’s impossible for the premises to be true without the conclusion being true.

Against Fearing Death

FD1. You cease to be conscious when you die.
FD2. If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn’t bad for you.
FD3. So, being dead isn’t bad for you.
FD4. If being dead isn’t bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death.
FD5. So, you shouldn’t fear death.

The Drinking Age Argument

DK1. Kristina is twenty years old.
DK2. If Kristina is twenty years old, then Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.
DK3. So, Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.

The Moral Argument

MA1. There are objective moral values.
MA2. If there are objective moral values, then God exists.
MA3. So, God exists.

Modus Ponens

If P, then Q.
P.
So, Q.

The Rearranged Drinking Age Argument

RD1. If Kristina is twenty years old, then Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.
RD2. Kristina is twenty years old.
RD3. So, Kristina is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.

The Mangled Drinking Age Argument

MD1. Jean Blanc is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.
MD2. If Jean Blanc is twenty years old, then Jean Blanc is not allowed to buy alcohol in the US.
MD3. So, Jean Blanc is twenty years old.

Modus Tollens

If P then Q.
~Q.
So, ~P.

Whales Aren’t Fish

WF1. If whales are fish, then whales use gills to breathe.
WF2. Whales don’t use gills to breathe.
WF3. So whales aren’t fish.

The Flipped Moral Argument

FM1. If God does not exist, then there are no objective moral values.
FM2. There are objective moral values.
FM3. So, God exists.

The Foreknowledge Argument

FK1. God knew before you were born that you were going to read this book.
FK2. If God knew before you were born that you were going to read this book, then you couldn’t have chosen not to read this book.
FK3. So, you couldn’t have chosen not to read this book.
FK4. If you freely choose to read this book, then you could have chosen not to read this book.
FK5. So, you didn’t freely choose to read this book.

Chained Conditional

If P then Q.
If Q then R.
So, if P then R.

Against Fearing Non-Existence

FN1. If you stop existing when you die, then being dead is not bad for you.
FN2. If being dead is not bad for you, then you shouldn’t fear death.
FN3. So, if you stop existing when you die, then you shouldn’t fear death.

The Right to the Womb Argument

RW1. If the embryo has a right to life, then the embryo has a right to use the mother’s womb.
RW2. If the embryo has a right to use the mother’s womb, then abortion is immoral.
RW3. So, if the embryo has a right to life, then abortion is immoral.

Universal Instantiation

All Fs are Gs.
o is F.
So, o is G

The Philosophical Genius Argument

PG1. All philosophers are geniuses.
PG2. Korman is a philosopher.
PG3. So, Korman is a genius.

The Cuteness Argument

CA1. Camilla is cute.
CA2. It’s wrong to eat cute things.
CA3. So, it’s wrong to eat Camilla.

The Cuteness Argument Reworded

CA2*. All cute things are things that are wrong to eat.
CA1*. Camilla is a cute thing.
CA3*. So, Camilla is a thing that is wrong to eat.

FLIGHT CONFUSION

I know that Olivia is due to fly from New York to Chicago, but I can’t remember if the flight was this morning, or if she’s flying tomorrow. So, I know she’s either in Chicago or New York right now, but I don’t know which.

The Defective Tollens

DT1. If Olivia is in Chicago, then Olivia must be in Illinois.
DT2. It’s not the case that Olivia must be in Illinois.
DT3. So, Olivia isn’t in Chicago.

TALENT SHOW

Celeste, Grant, and Esmée are the three finalists in a talent show. Celeste’s performance was a complete disaster. Grant did a pretty good job. Esmée gave the performance of a lifetime, and she receives a standing ovation from the audience as well as all the judges. The judges are about to announce the winner.

The Defective Ponens

DP1. A woman is going to win.
DP2. If a woman is going to win, then: if Esmée loses, then Celeste will win.
DP3. So, if Esmée loses, then Celeste will win.